On Emotions

Envy and Inequality

abstract

Envy seems to include the desire to eliminate inequality: the subject's unequal (namely, inferior) position compared to the object's position. In consequence, people raise two different claims regarding the envy-inequality relation: (a) the basis for envy is a concern for equality (and thus a reason for condemning this concern); and (b) reducing inequality will reduce envy (thus a reason for praising the concern for equality). The two claims constitute what seems to be the moral paradox of envy, namely, the fact that envy is morally condemned despite the apparent presence of an important moral component, namely, the desire to eliminate inequality. I believe that both claims are erroneous. I shall argue that envy does not involve a moral egalitarian concern and that reduced inequality does not lead to less envy—on the contrary, in most cases it raises the intensity of envy.

The major question discussed here concerns the dependence of the intensity of envy on the subject-object distance. Is envy more intense when the object's superiority is minor or when it is significant? This question can also be formulated in sociological terms: Will the reduction of social and economic gaps in a certain society lead to a reduction in the intensity of envy? Dealing with these related problems requires the examination of the nature of envy, and in particular whether the focus of concern in envy is the subject's inferiority or the object's undeserved good fortune. In light of the answer to this question, the major variables responsible for the intensity of envy are indicated and the type of correlation between envy and the subject-object inequality is described. In the final section this correlation is examined by briefly analyzing a society in which inequalities are significantly reduced.

Ben Ze’ev, A. (1992). Envy and Inequality. The Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 551-581

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