Dr Menahem Luz,
Presocratic Philosophers
Summary 8
Eleatic Philosophy
Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus
Contents
Fragments 6-7 tadpis p 15There are fragments of two works
Truth
Fragment 1 (tadpis p. 14)
Fragment 2-5 tadpis p 14-15
Fragments 8-9 (conclusions; tadpis p. 15):Therefore, only the real is, is conceivable -- and is describable
it is absurd to speak of the non-real as if in a meaningful way
Therefore, one cannot describe or conceive of the real as non-real or as non-being
Equally, one cannot describe or conceive of the non-real as real or as being
Therefore, one cannot say that the real is not -- neither existentially nor attributively
It follows, that the real cannot be conceived as as other than it is -- i.e. it must be conceived as being, as a unity of reality, as unchanging and continuous and as ever in the present
It follows that that what is (reality) is -- that is, exists -- for ever, with no divisions, is all alike with no beginning and no end
Arguments against motion (tadpis p. 16-17 no. 3-9) show the absurdity and contradictions in any supposition of motion or change
Melissos background
Melissos fragments Melissos: Conclusions
return to top
Arguments against plurality (tadpis p. 16 no. 1-2)
return to top
(tadpis p. 23)return to top
return to top