Some scholars have suggested that Plato based his property communism principle on an institution similar to that of common messes at the barracks of the Spartan fighting body. However, the Spartans shared only their black soup at camp, and did not share their homes and family life. They would individually have continued to maintain families, even if they did not reside with them for much of their lives.4 . By contrast, Plato¹s proposal would deprive the rulers of his ideal state of any landed interests at all ‹ and presumably, communize what remained of their homes and personal property. In effect, their lives would resemble a perpetual Prytany duty, residing in government buildings, eating government issue meals and using standard issue products held in common. In this sense, a parallel with the idealized Pythagoreans can be better drawn: the tripartite state, ruled by philosopher-Guardians.5 . The plan and summary of those sections of the Republic that discuss the communism theory are also encapsulated in Timaeus 18c, a dialogue reflecting much Pythagorean thought. The character of Timaeus is himself depicted as expert in Pythagorean mathematics, astronomy and medicine. He also originates from Epizephyrian Locrian, known to be in the same general area of early Pythagorean activity. It is true that it is Socrates, rather than Timaeus, who summarizes the communist principles of the Republic, but this is in conversation with a character who espouses Pythagorean lore in the rest of the dialogue. It is easy to draw very general parallels between Plato¹s communism of rulers and the secretive, communal life of the early Pythagoreans.6 . The latter were notorious for having set themselves apart from the inhabitants of Croton and Tarentum, whom they ruled as a subservient class according to the tenets of their philosophy.7 . It is thus easy to assume that the lives of the philosopher-rulers of the Republic and Timaeus were loosely modeled on an idealized form of the Pythagorean community. However, since the original details of the early Pythagorean communal life were unknown even in classical times, Plato could at the most be seen as merely setting his discussion in a Pythagorean mode.
That the communistic scheme is suggested only for the Philosopher-Rulers of his ideal state (Resp. 423e, 457a-b) does not make its aims more practical. It is unlikely that Plato himself would have seriously proposed putting into practice what would have spelled the end of family life, replacing it with a communism, not only of property and spouses (Rep. v 457 c-d), but also of children (hyeis/thygateres), parents (meteres/pateres), grandparents (pappai/tethai) and siblings (adelphai/adelphoi;461d-e).8 . While his avowed intention may have been to achieve a united society of rulers, both male and female (iv 423), he must surely have realized that, were this principle applied to society at large, its effects would have proved more tragic than the comic communism of wives depicted in Aristophanes¹ Ecclesiazusae.9 . If adopted for all citizens, it would have lead to the abolition of the household unit (oikos) and the consequent disruption of society.10 . In fact, Plato¹s suggestion is not put forward as a principle to be adopted by the society at large, but recommended only for its Guardians (phylakes), or philosopher-rulers (Rep. 423e, 457a-b, 462).11 . This was initially intended to free them from everyday property concerns in order to continue in unfettered contemplation of the good of the state. Secondly, it also conformed with the aim of breeding a eugenically wiser race of rulers for the next generation.12 . The abolition of the oikos as a social structure on this limited scale is to be envisaged as a means of eliminating unwarranted nepotism in those cases where children with moral defects were to be demoted from the ranks of the Guardians¹ offspring. There was thus absolutely no reason for the rest of the citizen body to lead this sort of life, since the other classes had their own jobs to do, government not being one of them. It is true that earlier, Plato had himself discussed the citizen body (Resp. 423c-d), but it is clear that they were distinct from the rulers (archontes) and Guardians (457b). The fact that there was no provisory body to pick out wives for the citizen body would make any such communism of wives superfluous and unwarranted. It is true that there was supposed to be an examination of the children of the lower ranks in order to promote them to the ranks of Guardians should they seem fit. This, however, was to be enacted long before the children were old enough to contract private marriages, or own private property of their own. If they were to be demoted, they would in adulthood be presumably free from the obligations and encumbrances imposed on the philosophical rulers. Their family life and property would then be individually held, just as those children who were promoted would presumably lose any property rights that they would inherit in adulthood.
It is thus perplexing when we examine Aristotle¹s reconstruction of Plato¹s suggestion. In the second book of his Politics, Aristotle devoted much of his criticisms of earlier political theory to Plato's Republic and Laws. While an empirical and practical approach would find much of his criticism of his teacher¹s ideal state justified, one section speaks of Plato¹s communist proposal as a constitutional point foisted upon the citizen body as a whole. Aristotle actually claims that the Republic discussed the possibility of a communism of children, wives and property shared among the citizens:
§nd°xetai går kaÐ t°knvn kaÐ gunaik«n kaÐ kthmãtvn koinvneðn toÁw pol¤taw éllÆloiw, Àsper §n tª Polite¤& tª Plãtvnow: §keð går ž Svkrãthw fhsÐ deðn koinå tå t°kna kaÐ tåw gunaðkaw e”nai kaÐ tåw ktÆseiw (Pol. 1261a.5-10).
To understand how Aristotle interpreted the Republic, we need also discuss his own view of the role of the oikos in the city. For Aristotle, koinonia of family life was not only an impractical expedient, but also one which contradicted the unity of the state, based upon his own analogy between it and the unity of family life.13 . Secondly, Aristotle's understanding of Plato implies that the rulers were the body of citizens (politai), while the other two classes were somehow subservient to them, in a relation not dissimilar to that of the Athenians citizen vis-à-vis the slaves and the commercial metoikoi. The role of the polites is thus reversed in the Republic and Politics. Aristotle is not, of course, known for the fairness of his criticisms of Plato in the Metaphysics and De Anima, where he has been accused of too literal an interpretation of Plato's myths.14 . Similarly, in the present case, he attacks Plato's theory of the abolition of marriage as an impractical impossibility (édÊnaton) "if taken literally as expressed" (Šw m¢n eýrhtai nËn,1236a10). However, in spite of this pretext, he cannot be accused of a literal interpretation of a Platonic myth in the Politics, but rather of extending Plato's constitution beyond its initial application. We see this a little later, when he remarks:
³It is more fitting for the communism of wives and children to be useful to farmers [scil. of Plato¹s Ideal State] than for Guardians since affection (philia) is found less where children and wives are held in common - and it is necessary for the governed to be of type that is obedient to government and does not revolt² (1262a40-1262b2).
A closer examination of the Greek text shows that this sentence should be split into two separate arguments under the guise of one. According to the first, the farmer class would find communism of families (koin«n –ntvn t«n t°knvn kaÐ t«n gunaik«n) useful (chresimon) since they have less (family and social) affection (½tton går ¶stai fil¤a; 1262a40-1262b1). According to the second, the farmer class would be disinclined to revolt if they were of type that lacked family ties (1262b2).
These arguments seem to be based on premises that Aristotle had worked out earlier in his Ethics, where he clearly distinguished between the separate meanings of the concept philia, (moral, family and political alliances etc.) 15 . The moral concept of philia is distinguished from mere passing Œacquaintance¹ and mutual self-interest. For Aristotle, it is something more like a stable union between people of the same virtuous outlook. This sort of affection is possible only between moral equals of a philosophical disposition. For this reason, only the philosophical rulers of Plato¹s Republic could be conceived by Aristotle as forming a true moral philia in its higher sense. On the other hand, the farmers and workers, who lacked philosophy, would be more prone to unstable social and family philia - and thus find that communism of children and wives (tÚ koinåw e”nai tåw gunaðkaw kaÐ toÁw paðdaw) more useful (chresimon; Pol. 1262b2). In his second argument, Aristotle suggests that the ruled (i.e., farming classes) should be of this type (i.e., having only communal families) with the result that they continue to be subservient to the rulers and not rebel. However, if they do not rebel, we may well ask if it is not because they have communal families, but because they do not form political alliances (politike philia). 16 .
In his translation of this passage, Barker implies that the farmers were not part of the citizen body proper, and Aubonnet clarifies this when he says that Aristotle included in the third class ³those who are not magistrates or guardians, but artisans, traders and also agrarians².17 . Aristotle seems again to have been swayed by his own special understanding of the role to be assumed by the polites in his Politics when he interpreted the Republic in the way that he did. Aristotle¹s Œcitizens¹ should not be immediately compared to the ruling classes in Plato¹s Republic, since the latter were more akin to magistrates. Likewise, Aristotle¹s non-ruling classes should not immediately be compared to Plato¹s fighting class and farmers who were not bidden to lead a communistic life. A closer examination of Aristotle does not allow us to draw this conclusion. In the third book of his Politics, he contrasts the Œcitizen simpliciter¹ to children, who are only potentially citizens, and the old who are no longer active citizens (Pol. 1275a14-22). In other words, Aristotle¹s concept of the citizen simpliciter is not confined to the ruling magistrates, but to the active enfranchised citizen body as a whole. It is no wonder that Aristotle finds Plato¹s proposal for a koinonia impractical for a large citizen body, entailing all that Aristotle included in the concept Œpolites¹. He finally concludes that a true citizen be defined not only as someone involved in active rule (arche) of the city, but also in general decision-making (krisis) (1275a23). While the arche would indeed refer to magistrature, the decision-making (krisis) would refer to the citizen¹s functions as juror (dikastes) and general assembly-man (ekklesiastes) as is shown by Aristotle¹s own examples (1275a 26). Later he includes under krisis not only this juridical function (kritike) but also a consultative (bouleutike) one as well (1275b19). At this point we should note two points of difference between Aristotle and Plato in order to comprehend his interpretation of the Republic. Since Aristotle does not separate the guards from the citizen-rulers of his ideal state as Plato did, it is obvious that Aristotle¹s ideal citizens would be involved in the army at one stage of their life. Secondly, since he had already defined citizenship as a participation (koinonein) in rule, he concludes that although manual workers (banausoi) and day-labourers (thetes) were freemen, they were not free from work ‹ and thus unfit to be good citizen rulers (1278a 11-12). In this sense they are not citizens simpliciter (haplos), but citizens only hypothetically speaking (ex hypotheseos), much like citizen-aliens (xenoi). He thus compares the manual workers with slaves ‹ the latter serving individuals and the former the community as a whole.
As for the slaves and freed-men (apeleutheroi), they were totally debarred from citizenship (1278a1-2). If Aristotle had mentioned only the slaves, we could understand that their social standing disbarred them, but since he also included the apeleutheroi, it is clear that their Œnatural state¹, as slaves by physis disbarred them from inclusion in the citizen body.18 . This principle would destroy the whole fluid basis of Plato¹s class of Guardian rulers. Not only does Aristotle expand the rulers to be all who act in a decision-making or consultative capacity, but he also removes Plato¹s principle that members of one class could pass up or down to another according to his individual, rather than natural capacities. We thus have to conclude that Aristotle¹s interpretation of Plato¹s koinonia was affected by his notion of philia and polites.
A solution proposed in the post-Aristotelian period was that of the Cynics, who criticized the value of the marriage institution as part of all accepted norms in society.19. However, whereas Diogenes may have dismissed marriage as a personal Cynic extreme in his attempt to return to an idealized natural state, he did not necessarily suggest abolishing it for the rest of society.20. Laertius notes a similarity to the Republic of Plato (VII.131),21. but he must have meant that Diogenes advocated non-marriage only for the (Cynic) wise man just as Plato had done for the philosopher rulers in the Republic.22. Diogenes¹ pupil, Crates, also advocated reforming the sexual habits of society (D.L. VI.85-86), but could not have sought to abolish marriage for the rest of society, as we see from Epictetus¹ assessment of Crates¹ infamous Cynic-marriage (kynogamia) with Hipparchia, which for all its non-normative eccentricities seems to have remained fairly constant.23. Similarly, Crates¹ own pupil, Zeno composed a Politeia, in which he suggested that the wise should hold women in common (koinai; D.L. VII.33), and was followed in this by Chrysippus (vii.131). Although Laertius states that Zeno wrote his Republic on the tail of a Cynic dog, Zeno does not consider the abolition of marriage and the oikos as an individualistic, Cynic extreme. The Stoics did not propose abolishing marriage, but delineated its character as a Stoic indifferent, for it is was no more wrong to avoid marriage than to engage in it.23. In fact, a little later, Laertius notes that Zeno did allow the wise man to marry (gamesein) and have children (VII.121), presumably as long as this did not compromise his other moral responsibilities. Nonetheless, if Laertius was correct in his comparison between Zeno and Plato, we would have to understand that the indifference of marriage applied only to the Stoic wise man, to be equated with Plato¹s philosopher-prince. All of these Politeiai then are totally different from Iambulus¹ rambling utopia of a far distant land, where there is a communism of wives and children in society as a whole.25. In contrast to Aristotle, they did not envisage koinonia as a state belonging to society as a whole, but only as a theoretical aspiration. We know that for the Stoic, material externals are morally Œindifferent¹ while morality alone is of true worth. Since Œinstitutional marriage¹ was regarded in their system as an indifferent, whether or not the citizen body recognized the truth of Stoic indifferents, or not, the morally neutral and indifferent value of marriage of the citizen body still does not approximate to absolute moral truth. In this sense, Zeno is no closer to Aristotle than to Plato, since for him, society is morally obliged to regard marriage as an indifferent. In practical terms, few would realise the state described in Zeno¹s Republic, but in theory, the indifference of marriage is incumbent on the whole of society. Thus we see a gradation, where Plato suggests communism of wives only for the ruling Œmagistrates¹ of his ideal politeia, Aristotle extends this to the farming and working class, while Zeno obliges the whole of society to regard it as an indifferent. There has been some discussion of Aristotelian influence on early Stoic logic and ethics, not all agreeing to the extent which it played in Stoic thought.26 In the present case, Zeno could not have accepted Aristotle¹s belief in the absolute value of the oikos for life in the polis. Nor could he have accepted Aristotle¹s mocking criticism that a communism of women would be more suited for the lower agricultural classes. Zeno it would seem went one step further than Aristotle, extending the principle, if not the fact of communism of women for all Stoic kosmopolitai. However, in accordance with Stoic ethic, the institution of marriage was dependent on higher moral criteria which would determine whether the Stoic wise man would enter that state, or not. He thus does not accept Aristotle¹s restoration of the importance of the oikos as the key-stone of society, but rather adopted Plato¹s communism of women as an attitude that could be morally justified by anyone in the whole of society, and not just by its rulers. Although there is a tendency to consider Plato¹s koinonia gynaikon as a temporary eccentricity of Plato¹s thought, we see that it was not only developed by subsequent philosophers, but also expanded yet further than he ever visualised.
You are the to read this since 4 (3-1-2000)
1830 visitors in 1998-1999
and its Hellenistic Development
Menahem Luz
Plato¹s notorious theory of communism (koinonia) of property for the rulers of his ideal state was later taken up, rightly or wrongly, as a blue-print for several modern political manifestos ‹ and put into practice in communities as diverse as collective farms and religious cloisters (Rep. v 457 c-d). Even his extension of this principle to a communism of wives (461d-e) served many a hair-brained commune of hippies in the 1960¹s.1 . However, Plato is quite clear that the communistic scheme is suggested only for the Guardians or Philosopher-Rulers of his ideal state (Resp. 423e, 457a-b). The military class, the farmers and workers lived relatively conventional lives, holding private property and establishing families on an individual basis. Whether or not the scheme described in the Republic was merely a thought experiment, a theoretical, but impractical extension of Plato¹s principles of government,2 the application of his proposals were totally misrepresented by his closest pupil. Aristotle actually claims that the Republic discussed the communism of children, wives and property shared among the citizen body as a whole (Pol. 1261a)! The question then that I propose to discuss is why Aristotle developed this specific interpretation of the Republic in the face of the written text.3 . What sections of his own philosophy would have swayed him to misrepresent Plato¹s argument in this way? Later, we will also examine discussions of Plato¹s political theory among Hellenistic thinkers to see how they developed their own philosophy in the face of this criticism. I will open, however, first with a brief glance at the origin of Plato¹s communist principle - and secondly, at the way in which he presented it.